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Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, union-driven regional coalition building has become a major issue in North 
American labor research.  As unions construct local organizations and join community coalitions to 
win improvements in the quality of local jobs, they have moved beyond traditional roles of 
representation and collective bargaining.  These new partnerships involve direct action on local 
issues, including workforce development and training, public subsidies (sometimes including 
accountability rules), transportation and other infrastructure needs and investment, real estate 
development and urban sprawl.1  Although these initiatives are all works in progress, unions may be 
finding new vitality by promoting high road economic development.   
This paper describes a shifting, fluid coalition of trade unionists, labor educators, business 
people and community groups in Buffalo, New York.  Union leaders have played a growing role in 
dialogue to tackle the region’s chronic crisis.  With the help of labor educators, mostly based at 
Cornell’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR), they have brought labor, management, and 
other community groups together to deal with the standard economic development issues, like 
worker training, improving the competitiveness of some of the region’s largest employers and 
marketing the region.  They have also waged a successful living wage campaign and helped create a 
union-driven economic development agency in the region.  Together with labor educators, Buffalo’s 
unions are building a high-road social infrastructure of nonprofit organizations and informal 
networks to sustain these efforts.  
                                                 
1  Reynolds, David B. (2002). Taking the High Road: Communities Organize for Economic Change. Armonk, N.Y., 
M.E. Sharpe, Nissen, Bruce (2004). "The Effectiveness and Limits of Labor-Community Coalitions. Evidence from 
South Florida." Labor Studies Journal  29(1): Pp. 67-89., Ness, Immanuel and Stuart Eimer (2002).  Central Labor 
Councils and the Renewal of American Unionism: Organizing for Justice in Our Communities.  Armonk, N.Y., 
M.E. Sharpe.  For an interesting European parallels, see Fricke, Werner and Peter Totterdill (2004). Action Research 
in Workplace Innovation and Regional Development. Philadelphia, John Benjamins.  Doerre, Klaus, Birgit Beese 
and Berndt Roettger (2002). "The "New Economy."  A New Model for Development Coalitions?" Concepts and 
Transformation  7(1): Pp. 57-71, van Klaveren, Maarten (2002). "The FNV "Industribution" Project: Trade Union 
Learning in the Netherlands." Concepts and Transformation  7(2): Pp. 203-224. 
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Buffalo is a union town facing serious economic problems and lacking a clear overall public 
policy response.  The tools of business unionism, wage negotiations and particularistic political 
action, no longer address the social and political challenges –– job losses, fiscal crises of local 
government, racial and economic polarization – that the region now faces.  As elsewhere, Greater 
Buffalo’s unionists are locked in a debate over the path ahead, torn between consolidating existing 
accomplishments in old arenas (collective bargaining and politics) and initiating new forms of 
participation in broader policymaking arenas (local dialogue and community coalitions).  Meanwhile, 
many employers still do not accept unions as a given, and a significant segment of management 
rejects cooperation with unions as counterproductive to creating a business-friendly economic 
climate.  Labor and management approach local cooperation, not as two cohesive class-based blocs 
with clear strategies, but as a collection of individuals engaged in dialogue and tentative 
experimentation on an ad hoc basis.  As an engine for economic growth, the region’s established 
development structures and politics have proven unsuccessful.  This lack of a robust urban 
development regime arguably creates opportunities for community-minded unions in Buffalo. 
 
Buffalo’s Crisis  
 
Buffalo’s economic fortunes have, over the past century, markedly changed.  Located at the most 
important transport node between Midwestern farms, mines and factories and east coast consumer 
markets, Buffalo was once well situated for transit, commerce, and manufacturing industries.  
Known as the Queen City of the Great Lakes, Buffalo was tied with San Francisco as the 10th largest 
city in the US, with 506,000 residents in the 1920 census.  Its importance in transport, commerce 
and heavy industry, however, began to wane after World War II.2   
                                                 
2 Goldman, Mark (1983). High Hopes: the Rise and Decline of Buffalo, New York. Albany: SUNY Press. 
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By the 1970s, Buffalo was beginning to suffer the effects of economic decline, as the 
waterfront commerce, aerospace, electronics and steel industries all faced collapse.  From 1969 to 
2003 manufacturing employment dropped in the metropolitan area from 180,000 to 88,000.  
Between 1970 and 1990, Erie County shed all but 3,100 out of nearly 29,000 jobs in primary metals, 
mainly steel.  Since the mid 1980s, however, manufacturing employment has stabilized (Figure 1).  
The auto industry has provided some of this stability, as local auto parts plants have achieved 
enough investment to offset much of the loss of jobs to lean production, technological change and 
low-wage competition elsewhere.3  Dependence on outside investment (i.e., from Detroit-based 
automakers and lawmakers in Albany and Washington) has intensified, as many of the employers 
that have grown up in Buffalo (Trico Products, Buffalo China and Client Logic) have exited the 
region.   
Population decline followed economic decline.  After a peak of 580,000 in 1950, the city 
began to lose residents to the suburbs.  By 1980 it was the nation’s 58th largest city with 350,000 
residents.  The metropolitan region as a whole, although faring somewhat better, also declined: after 
a peak of 1.4 million in 1970, the population had slid to 1.2 million by 2000.4
Suburbanization has made the region highly unequal, placing native-born blacks, who 
comprise a third of the city’s population, at a deep disadvantage.  Blacks have a poverty rate of 36 
percent, about 15 points higher than the city’s population as a whole.5  Compared to the city, the 
suburbs are overwhelmingly white and have much lower unemployment rates (Table 1).  Buffalo’s 
whites are largely descended from the Poles, Italians, Irish and Germans, who migrated to the city 
during decades of industrial expansion.  As they dispersed into the suburbs, urban neighborhoods 
                                                 
3 According to the US Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns reports, the auto industry shed nearly 5,000 out of 
more than 16,000 jobs between 1970 and 1985.  Between 1985 and 2000 the industry shrank much more slowly, 
from 11,600 to 10,400 jobs. 
4 Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years. 
5 Table three of Henry Louis ’s Taylor’s 1990 book, African Americans and the Rise of Buffalo's Post-Industrial 
City (Buffalo: Urban League) shows that the gap between black poverty and overall poverty was historically the 
largest in the US’s major cities; only Miami had a greater gap. 
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lost that ethnic identity.  African-American institutions, such as churches and community service 
organizations, by contrast, have retained their vitality, partly because of their struggles during the 
civil rights era. 
Market-driven free enterprise has proven ineffective in addressing these problems.  
Abundant resources—miles of undeveloped waterfront, ample renewable energy, highly skilled labor 
force with a strong work ethic, distinguished institutions of higher education, exceptional arts and 
cultural institutions, and rich architectural assets—have not attracted sufficient private investment.  
Furthermore, Western New York’s strategic geographic location as the second largest port of entry 
into the U.S. has failed to bring job-creating capital, even in this period of rapidly expanding 
international trade.   
Meanwhile, local government is increasingly incapable of filling in the economic cracks.  In 
Buffalo, the diminishing municipal tax base has led to chronic budget problems, fiscal insolvency 
and a 2003 takeover of municipal finances by a state-appointed control board.  At the time, various 
commissions and suburban interests proposed “reforms” that would have effectively abolished the 
city government by merging it with the county government.  Then, in early 2005, Erie County faced 
its own fiscal meltdown due to a taxpayer revolt against a proposed sales tax increase.  The county’s 
crisis resulted in the largest round of layoffs since the plant closures of the 1980s, a loss of as many 
as 2,000 jobs, or nearly 20% of the county workforce.  The government’s attempts to reduce costs, 
services and employees have met resistance from public sector unions and sparked controversy and 
consternation throughout the community.   
Local business interests are represented by a pair of organizations.  The Buffalo Niagara 
Partnership (BNP) carries out lobbying work and other business services, and the Buffalo Niagara 
Enterprise (BNE) markets the region as a globally competitive investment location.  Participants in 
these organizations include managers at local firms (like the newspaper and two large banks) and 
those who are posted at local branch plants owned by global firms (like Quebecor World, GM and 
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Ford).  The BNE sees itself as a “systems integrator” that connects potential investors with 
information and assists in the details of opening a new establishment.  Although traditionally not 
accustomed to working with unions for economic development, some parts of organized business 
have begun to do so, based mainly on their experiences with in-firm partnership. 
 
Portrait of a Union Town  
 
Buffalo remains, after decades of deindustrialization and membership decline, a union town.  In 
2003, Buffalo’s union density was 25.3%, placing it at 13th among the U.S.’s 260 metropolitan areas, 
a drop of nearly 5% from the previous year.6  This figure was an all-time low for the city, whose 
union density has oscillated between 26 and 33 percent since the mid 1980s (Table 1).   
The Central Labor Council (CLC), known as the Buffalo AFL-CIO Council, is the city’s 
umbrella organization for unions.  Buffalo is also the center of an Area Labor Federation (ALF), a 
larger umbrella organization, led by the head of the local painters union.  The ALF covers several 
counties in Western New York, from Lake Ontario to the Pennsylvania border, from Lake Erie to 
the western edge of Rochester.  Because its staff is identical to that of the Buffalo CLC, it has 
limited activity aside from that of the CLC.   
The most important unions are in health care, construction, transportation, manufacturing 
and public services.  The chemical, textile and machinists unions have been hit especially hard by the 
restructuring of their industries in the past few years, while earlier crises decimated traditionally 
strong waterfront, milling, electronics and steel unions.  Meanwhile, some construction, public 
service, transport and health care unions have experienced modest growth.   
                                                 
6 Hirsch, Barry and David Macpherson (2003). "Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current 
Population Survey: Note." Industrial and Labor Relations Review  56(2): Pp. 349-354. 
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During the manufacturing boom of the early 20th century, the city’s unions were nearly 
absent from heavy industry and made several unsuccessful attempts to organize outside their 
strongholds of construction, transportation and craft-based manufacturing (like printing).  
Lackawanna Steel moved its operations just south of Buffalo’s city limits around the turn of the 
century, partly to escape unions, and, after a buyout by Bethlehem Steel, became the largest private 
employer in the region.  Similarly, both GM and Ford established major facilities in Buffalo as 
strategies to reduce their dependence on powerful local unions in Michigan’s vertically integrated 
auto plants.  In the 1920s and 1930s, Ford, Bethlehem Steel, and others, spent lavishly to monitor, 
and at times brutally attack, labor organizers.  In the 1930s and 40s, local CIO unions, including the 
United Auto Workers and the Steelworkers, armed with new labor laws and an alliance with local 
and national Democrats and the local Catholic Church, organized most of the heavy industry.7  
In the post-war era, unions, more powerful and militant than ever, expanded beyond their 
craft and industrial bases.  Cornell’s new ILR School established an office in Buffalo to train both 
unionists and employers to deal with the then-new administrative procedures for worker 
representatives enshrined in the Wagner Act (1935) and Taft Hartley Act (1947).  With the 
expansion of public services and the right to organize in state and local government (codified in 
1967 by New York’s Taylor law) public sector unions grew.   
By the late 1970s, some of the area’s labor leaders began to consider new strategies to 
preserve jobs and membership.  According to a 1976 study by a joint task force of local politicians, 
business leaders and trade unionists, the metropolitan area was, along with Detroit and Kansas City, 
one of the most strike-prone cities in the country.8   With support from the state and local 
government and local labor educators, labor officials led workplace change in the 1980s and early 
                                                 
7 McDonnell, James (1970). The Rise of the CIO in Buffalo, New York, 1936-1942. Department of History.  
Madison,  University of Wisconsin. 
8 Ahearn, Robert (1985). The Emergence of Community Labor-Management Cooperation. Industrial Democracy: 
Strategies for Community Revitalization. Warner Woodworth, Christopher Meek and William Foote Whyte, Eds. 
Beverly Hills: Sage.  
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90s that brought unprecedented growth to in-firm employee involvement and quality of work life 
programs.   
Although Buffalo’s unions were on the cutting edge of the quality of work life movement, 
they were slower to adopt the broader approaches associated with the “organizing model.”  The 
CLC did not adopt the AFL-CIO’s “union cities” agenda during the mid-1990s, and Buffalo’s 
unions have had very few of the organizing successes seen elsewhere since then.  Its elected full-time 
president and two staff members have focused in recent years mainly on the political campaigns of 
their Democratic allies.  In 2005, CLC leadership changed with the election of a new part-time 
president, the president of the musicians’ union, who has participated in high-road activities during 
the 1990s, especially as a leader in the financial restructuring and revitalization of the Buffalo 
Philharmonic Orchestra.  He has pledged to broaden the scope of the council’s activity by hiring a 
new full-time organizer and expanding the CLC’s role in community-based economic development 
initiatives. 
 
Union Approaches to Economic Development  
 
Outside the building trades’ historic strategy of partnering with industry contractors to promote 
construction, the earliest economic development initiatives were based on the strong positions of 
unions inside large employers.  Over time, the focus of cooperation broadened beyond the 
workplace.  Unions have hoped to gain relevance to new kinds of work by addressing issues beyond 
those usually discussed in collective bargaining.  This section describes the movement from 
workplace and regional labor-management partnership, to the creation of nonprofits to carry out 
economic development projects and activist mobilizations.  Despite some shortcomings in the 
approach, Buffalo’s unions – or, more precisely, certain union leaders – have built a comprehensive 
approach to economic development, including dialogue with business over economic development, 
Greer and Fleron  Page 8 
autonomous union-driven initiatives and contentious campaigns against low-road employers.  This 
network, with its shared view of how the region could attract, retain, and improve jobs, forms the 
social foundations of the growing local high road social infrastructure.  
 
In-plant labor-management partnership.  Until the 1970s, most unions did not view themselves as having a 
role in economic development; they had grown by organizing workers in the expanding 
manufacturing and public sectors.  This began to change with the establishment of the Buffalo Area 
Labor-Management Committee (BALMC).  In the 1980s and 1990s, Cornell-based action 
researchers and labor educators provided training and technical assistance to in-plant cooperative 
efforts, which sought to strengthen the link between in-plant participation and job retention.  
Although most unions have broadened their focus, in-plant cooperation remains strong in most of 
the major plants that remain. 
The Buffalo Area Labor-Management Committee was established in the mid-1970s by a 
working group, including the mayor, the county executive, the congressional delegation, five labor 
leaders and five management representatives.  The county funded the project with $30,000.  
BALMC organizers excluded the public sector, which they viewed as too “volatile and immature.”  
They focused on establishing labor-management committees and mediating strikes at local 
manufacturing plants.  Functioning labor management committees emerged in dozens of companies, 
including several large ones.  Sectoral committees attempted to make improvements in specific areas 
like the waterfront, which included the grain mills, resulting in more flexibility in work practices, a 
study of the port facilities in 1978 and some public dollars for new cranes.  They also sought to 
consolidate the role of the county’s Industrial Development Agency, which shared both leadership 
and office space with the BALMC.  The neighboring suburb of Tonawanda established its own 
ALMC, involving seven in-plant committees, to "[raise] the consciousness of local labor leaders."  
BALMC attempted to resolve several protracted strikes and was instrumental in building a coalition 
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to assist 10,000 laid off workers from Bethlehem Steel after 1977.9  Despite some early successes, 
BALMC lost its funding and leadership and had withered away by the 1990s. 
Cornell’s Program on Employment and Work Systems (PEWS) took the approach further in 
the 1980s.10  At two troubled local automotive parts plants – Trico’s windshield wiper plants and 
GM’s plant in nearby Lockport – PEWS action researchers helped set up joint labor-management 
committees to find new efficiencies in order to prevent or slow outsourcing and offshoring.  At the 
core of these efforts was a cost study team, which, unlike a traditional labor-management committee, 
addressed specific threats of job loss.  In both cases, the teams slowed the loss of jobs by identifying 
alternative ways to cut costs, thus saving money without closing parts of plants or outsourcing.  At 
the Lockport plant, the team saved 35 jobs by identifying $1.2 million in waste and saving the 
company more money than outsourcing would have.  At Trico, the stakes were considerably higher: 
the company was shifting 1,300 out of 2,400 jobs to a pair of plants in Matamoros and Brownsville.  
After a public outcry, the state government funded PEWS to work with union leaders, engineers and 
managers to find an alternative to the plant closure.  Trico management reluctantly allowed the team 
to conduct its inquiry, and then largely ignored its proposals (although it reduced the number of 
immediate layoffs to 300).  Despite these efforts, the layoffs came: Trico closed its last Buffalo 
factory in 2003, and employment at the GM, now Delphi, Lockport plant continues to slide under 
competitive pressures and new technology in auto manufacturing. 
Labor-management partnership continued to spread throughout Western New York’s 
industrial landscape after the 1980s.  The United Auto Workers with both GM and Ford pioneered 
extensive joint training programs, established under the terms of firm-level national bargaining, to 
support in-plant worker participation.  Various locals and Buffalo-based Region 9 of the UAW 
joined with local auto plant management and Cornell ILR’s Institute for Industry Studies 
                                                 
9 ibid. 
10 Klingel, Sally and Ann Martin (1988). A Fighting Chance. Ithaca, ILR Press. 
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(established in 1986) to create industry education programs.  IIS trained thousands of autoworkers 
on the economics of the industry, providing a forum for discussing local union and management 
strategies and facilitating employee involvement in workplace change.11  The homegrown solutions 
that emerged in the plants were shared through an organization formed specifically to promote best 
practices among local unions and managers.  The Western New York Employee Involvement 
Council thrived for over a decade as a professional organization of unionists and managers from the 
public and private sectors, as well as educators from ILR.  Hundreds of union officials, union 
members, human resource managers and educators attended quarterly dinner program meetings and 
semiannual conferences featuring national speakers as well as local workshops.   
A 2000 study by ILR researchers found that labor-management relations in the region had 
become quite harmonious.  Fifteen case studies found labor-management partnership firmly 
established in some of the region’s largest private employers in services and manufacturing.  At 
American Axle’s Tonawanda Forge, UAW and Machinists’ union officials and managers 
collaborated to revitalize a former GM plant.  In addition to winning investment and expanding 
employment in the plant, the union proposed a new machining plant in Cheektowaga, which would 
save the company transport costs and create 120 new jobs, albeit at a lower wage than at the forge.  
At GM’s engine plant, UAW officials worked with management to find efficiencies and attract 
enough investment to make it the world’s largest engine factory, measured by production volume.  
Seven craft unions at the local Quebecor World printing plant faced the loss of a major contract, the 
printing of Readers’ Digest, to a non-union competitor.  They worked with management to 
negotiate and implement various “high performance” work practices.  New investment and orders 
led to the recall of over 400 laid off workers and a plant expansion creating 350 additional jobs.  
Other tales of labor-management collaboration included Outokompu American Brass, Empire 
                                                 
11 Ferman, Louis A., Michele Hoyman, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and Ernest J. Savoie, Eds.  Joint Training 
Programs: A Union-Management Approach to Preparing Workers for the Future, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
ILR Press, 1991. 
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Specialty Steel, Honeywell, Kaleida Health, Catholic Health System, General Mills, TOPS markets, 
the Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra and several large construction projects.12  
In-plant partnership may have provided some stability in Buffalo’s manufacturing industries 
in the 1990s, but it also had limitations.  Despite positive labor relations, firms continued to exit, and 
job losses in manufacturing continued to outweigh gains.  Low-cost competition may have 
stimulated cooperation, but it also forced plant closures, putting unions in some very difficult 
situations.  The cost of doing business was a concern bigger than the workplace: it involved broader 
local issues like the labor market, energy costs, taxes, and, most importantly, the intensification of 
price-based competition.  Furthermore, as the unionized sector shrank, the community’s problems, 
such as the extreme inequality between blacks and whites, the fiscal crisis of local government and 
the reluctance of transnational firms to set up shop in Buffalo, were beyond the reach of in-plant 
partners.  As deindustrialization progressed and the non-union sector expanded, unions began to 
broaden their vision.  
  
Economic Development Group, Inc. (EDG).  The EDG dates to 1999 when union officials met to devise 
a response to the Buffalo Niagara Enterprise, then a newly formed project of local business people 
and politicians to attract private investment to the region.  The founding meetings of EDG, 
facilitated by Cornell ILR educators, generated consensus on a vision for the region’s future and on 
practical economic strategies that unions could pursue to realize their vision.  EDG has become a 
nonprofit organization with broad support from local unions, dedicated to supporting and 
generating new community based economic development projects.   
Rather than limiting its attention to outside investors or individual employers, the Economic 
Development Group has attempted to focus on local community-based development.  EDG 
                                                 
12 Fleron, Lou Jean, Howard Stanger and Eileen Patton (2000). Champions at Work: Employment, Workplace 
Practices and Labor-Management Relations in Western New York.  Buffalo,  ILR Great Lakes Region. 
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currently has a paid staff of one.  The executive director is a professional organizer and grant writer, 
whose primary job is to launch projects.  A board of 25-30 trade unionists meets quarterly to govern 
EDG’s initiatives.  These projects involve ambitious goals and some require several years of 
proposing, planning and coalition building before implementation. 
The provision of cheap power was an early goal of EDG organizers.  The first full-time 
coordinator was an IBEW member, who worked at a local electric utility.  He argued to his 
employer that economic development initiatives in the city of Buffalo served the company’s interest 
because they allowed the firm to use existing infrastructure.  He calculated that, after decades of 
population decline, the city’s unused power infrastructure could serve two to three hundred 
thousand additional residents at no additional cost to the company.  If new customers used an 
existing house that already had a meter and was connected to the electricity grid, as opposed to 
building more in the sprawling suburbs, the benefits to the company’s bottom line should be self-
evident.  Unfortunately, the company sent him back to his job as an electrician after a short period 
of working on company time as EDG coordinator.13
Other EDG leaders have also worked in a multi-year relicensing process to assure the flow 
of low-cost electricity to the region’s large high-road employers, beginning formally in 2002 (and 
informally much earlier).  A 50-year license to operate a power plant just downstream from Niagara 
Falls expires in 2007.  Under the old license, the New York Power Authority (NYPA), the operator 
of the plant, was required to set aside fixed amounts of low-priced electricity to local employers.  
The chief beneficiaries of this arrangement were 100 companies, employing 50,000 employees, 
which received discounted power (initially, in the 1960s, to compensate for the power shortage 
brought on by the destruction of an earlier power plant in a rockslide).  For large employers, the 
savings run into the millions of dollars.  When NYPA announced that it had spent $30 million on 
legal fees to relicense the much smaller St. Lawrence dam, an opportunity opened up.  By shifting to 
                                                 
13 Wilcox, Phil.  Highlights of the value to Niagara Mohawk.  Report, dated June 18, 2002.  Buffalo. 
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a consensus model of relicensing – with the support of the licensing agency, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission  – NYPA will have resources, in theory, to divert to brownfields cleanup, 
recreation areas and other local needs.  Unions, especially the UAW, were interested from the 
beginning in keeping the cheap power, to prevent increases in production costs that could stifle 
future corporate investment.  Environmentalists, county and municipal governments, Indian tribes, 
business interests and unions entered the process.  The area director of the United Auto Workers 
and chairman of the board of EDG is the co-chairman of the Western New York Relicensing 
Consensus Committee, and other EDG activists serve on several sub-committees.  Several years into 
the process, it seems likely that the coalition will succeed in retaining cheap power and diverting 
resources to community development projects.1414   
A second project addresses energy issues through a new downtown heating scheme.  District 
Energy, unlike the relicensing initiative, is organized solely by the EDG.  In April 2001, the Buffalo 
city government announced its intention to develop a district energy system modeled on a new 
biomass heat plant in St. Paul, Minnesota and facilities common in European cities.  The city council 
named EDG as the developer of choice for the project, which seeks to reduce heating costs and 
pollution while creating quality jobs.  Organizers estimate that the new heat will reduce costs by as 
much as 40% for downtown businesses, hospitals, government agencies, the public schools and 
housing projects.  Local farmers will produce energy crops to fuel the plant, which will pollute less 
than the current system.  The new facility will create a handful of skilled jobs downtown employed 
by a new nonprofit corporation founded by the EDG.  Despite some early difficulties in finding a 
company to provide technical expertise, the project raised $27 million by issuing bonds, and EDG 
will be operating phase one with the existing district energy loop later this year.   
Training has also been on the EDG agenda.  The local building trades unions had welcomed 
a major opportunity in a new billion-dollar state-funded reconstruction project for Buffalo Public 
                                                 
14 See the incredibly detailed project website http://niagara.nypa.gov/.  
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Schools.  Under the Project Labor Agreement (PLA), hiring rules would secure well-paying jobs for 
local union members and also require racial and gender diversity, not only on the site, but also in 
their overall membership.  The PLA mandated contributions from contractors on the project into a 
preapprenticeship program that would bring minority youth into building trades’ apprenticeship 
programs.  After a high-profile start, the complexity of the training system proved to be beyond the 
capability of the building trades alone to implement.  
EDG took over the management of the preapprenticeship funding attached to the school 
PLA, and redesigned and renamed the effort the Buffalo-Niagara Jobs Initiative (BNJI).  Rather 
than focusing exclusively on labor force needs in construction, the BNJI works as a network, 
connecting training providers to trainees in minority communities (mainly black and Latino), in 
response to broader labor market demands.  Construction trade unions provide on the job training 
for those trainees tracked into urban residential housing rehabilitation, some of whom will go on to 
union apprenticeship programs, others into higher education, or residential construction jobs.  It 
remains contested whether the initiative will supply workers to nonunion employers or cooperate 
with business organizations like the Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC).  Antipathy to 
unionism, which, in the ABC’s case, is anchored in the organization’s constitution, creates real 
difficulties for dialog.   
The EDG is a growing nonprofit organization with considerable potential to improve 
training, urban housing and energy provision.  In 2005, it plans to hire four additional staff, to 
manage the projects and conduct training.  Additional people will work as apprentices in residential 
rehabilitation and on the district energy project.  Of the projects discussed here that comprise 
Buffalo’s expanding high-road social infrastructure, the EDG is the most thoroughly union-driven 
one.  Although its leaders are among the most effective and respected local union officials, who also 
occupy leadership positions within the traditional union structures, EDG operates with some 
distance or independence from both the CLC and the ALF.  The EDG has relied on very little 
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union funding for support.   Instead, EDG activists and organizers create self-sustaining projects 
and view their own volunteer activities as an investment of social capital in the wider community.   
 
The Champions Network.  While the EDG is undertaking these direct development projects, they also 
follow a “two-lane high road” strategy that includes continuing collaboration with willing 
progressive employers in the region.15  The Champions Network emerged from the above-
mentioned report on labor-management relations, Champions at Work, and exists as an informal 
network organized around specific development projects.  Staff of the local Cornell ILR office and 
two recently retired union officials provide organizational support to the network, which is directed 
by a volunteer steering committee of labor and management representatives. 
 Published in 2000, the Champions report assessed labor-management relations in the region 
using case studies of successful workplace-level partnership and original sample survey data.  The 
survey was based on a randomly selected sample of private sector employers from the eight counties 
of Western New York and, because of the smaller available number, the total universe of private 
sector unions in the region utilizing the NYS Department of Labor database.  The employers were 
large and small, in a wide range of sectors, unionized and non-unionized.  Over two thirds of 
employers reported that they had a higher quality workforce in Western New York than elsewhere.  
They also reported a much higher use of high performance work practices, like teams, quality circles, 
job rotation and peer reviews than national surveys.  Local unionized employers were shown to have 
low turnover, a high level of skill and experience and, in three quarters of the cases, “professional” 
or “harmonious” labor-management relations.  More than half of both managers and unionists 
reported in the survey that labor-management relations were improving, and half of those said that 
the improvement contributed to improved company performance.  The report presented its 
                                                 
15 Fleron, Lou Jean, and Ron Applegate.  Building a Two-Lane High Road: Unions and Economic Development in 
Western New York.  Perspectives on Work, The Magazine of the IRRA, Volume 8, No. 1, Summer 2004. 
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argument – that the strength of the region’s unions could create advantages for new investors – was 
published in a glossy, accessible format.  The BNE and other marketers of the region used the 
report to make a case to potential investors nervous about the region’s high union density.16   
 The report’s fifteen case studies were based on extensive taped and transcribed interviews 
with business owners, human resource managers and union officials undertaken by a team of 
experienced labor and management volunteers under the direction of Cornell ILR researchers.  The 
interview process and supplemental research to complete the case studies created relationships 
among the employer, union and university participants, forming the basis of the Champions 
Network.  Since the region’s delegation to the state legislature funded the report, it was released at a 
public event attended by civic, business and union leaders.   
In 2003-2004 ILR staff led a series of focus groups under the banner of the Champions 
Network, first with labor, then with management, then a combined group.  Participants reported on 
their opinions about the impediments to economic development, and ILR staff presented the results 
to the combined group.  They found considerable agreement.  Union leaders and managers shared a 
willingness to promote the region as a high road economy (by approaching government officials, 
community organizations and potential investors) and reported high road labor-management 
relations at their own workplaces.  Unionists and managers shared the perceptions that the current 
regional development strategies were not “high road,” the quality of the workforce was the region’s 
most important asset and local government was the biggest impediment to job retention.  Opinions 
about the best solutions diverged some: while union leaders favored capital investment, employers 
stressed government reform.  Over a third of business leaders admitted difficulties creating jobs for 
disadvantaged communities, while nearly two-thirds of union leaders saw major flaws in their own 
outreach and public relations.  
                                                 
16 Fleron, Stanger, et al. 2000. 
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They followed these discussions with a conference on high road economic development.  It 
included a broad spectrum of the local polity.  About 45% of attendees were unionists, 30% came 
from community groups and 25% were managers.  The program featured such distinguished 
speakers as Amy Dean, founding director of Working Partnerships USA; Bruce Colburn, co-founder 
of Sustainable Milwaukee; Tom Croft, executive director of the Steel Valley Authority and the 
Heartland Labor Capital Network; and Morton Bahr, President of the Communications Workers of 
America.  It prompted further debate and enthusiasm and strengthened relationships with 
community organizations beyond labor and management. 
Based on the focus groups and the discussions at the “high road conference,” the 
Champions Network established three task forces.  One committee, headed by an official from the 
communications union CWA and a manager from a health insurer, concerns economic development 
policy.  They have consulted with heads of the region’s Industrial Development Agencies about how 
to improve economic development incentives.  A second project, chaired by a local beverage 
distributor and the head of the teachers union, promotes voter registration and civic involvement, 
and uses the workplace as a forum to get out the vote and focus political attention on the shared 
needs of companies and workers.  The third task force, on “regional image,” is co-chaired by a 
retired representative from the clerical union OPEIU and a manager from a large 
telecommunications firm.  Their primary activity is to support the “Believe in Buffalo Niagara” 
campaign, launched by a local physician, to collect 100,000 signatures on a letter touting the region’s 
virtues and dynamism.  Once collected, organizers plan to send the letter to several hundred 
consultants and CEOs responsible for investment decisions, and to get supporting letters from high-
level government officials, such as the two U.S. senators.  This project has broad support: local 
unions, businesses, schools and civil society organizations (ranging from realtors and the BNE to 
unions and the Coalition for Economic Justice) have provided website and design services and 
turned out volunteers for signature gathering.   
Greer and Fleron  Page 18 
The Champions Network continues to publicize examples of high road job creation and 
retention through local in-plant partnership and issues an annual “Champions @ Work Award.”  
The first recipient, in June 2004, was the local Ford Stamping Plant and UAW Local 897, whose 
jointly led production improvements brought representatives from all of Ford’s North American 
plants to the area for a meeting of the Lean Implementation Network.  
As a network of unionists and business leaders, the Champions Network allows labor 
officials and activists to contribute to discussions about the future of the region.  Its latest project, 
an economic development trade show planned for 2006, is driven by the regional chapter of the 
National Electrical Contractors Association.  The Champions Network has an educational role, 
teaching the business community the value of organized labor in the community and promoting a 
better understanding of mutual concerns.  This has led, for example, to BNE officials referring 
investors worried about local unions directly to union leaders involved in EDG and the Network.  
Champions may eventually influence policymaking, change the priorities of politicians and improve 
the way government handles subsidies.  For participants, these activities are, in themselves, a 
contribution to the region’s quality of life.   
Broad, local labor-management partnership, however, is unlikely to change the fundamental 
aversion of global or national investors to highly unionized regions.  This criticism, however, applies 
to any policy to attract private sector jobs through outside capital investment.  Since the key 
decision-makers are elsewhere – in corporate headquarters, global consulting firms and financial 
centers – their investment choices often disregard local concerns and follow the low-road 
competitive model.  Perhaps more promising in the long run, the network is exploring opportunities 
for locally controlled capital development in the region.  
 
Coalition for Economic Justice (CEJ).  Alongside the dialogue between labor and business leaders, 
another channel of influence has created: an organization devoted to mobilization and social justice.  
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CEJ originally formed in the 1980s to fight the loss of Trico jobs to Mexico and later affiliated with 
Jobs with Justice.  It organizes community support for union struggles, workers rights and 
progressive public policies like the living wage.  Governed by a board of union and religious leaders, 
it is staffed by dynamic young leaders who connect the labor movement with the region’s forces of 
political progressivism.  
 In recent years, CEJ and its Workers Rights Board (WRB) have supported local and national 
struggles, including several local strikes.  Grievances from local hospitals and from national targets 
Wal-Mart and textile services firm Cintas were aired in the first WRB reception in 2004.  They have 
also assisted in rally turnout, most recently, for city workers, nurses and Adelphia workers.  They 
also supported workers at an Oregon diary farm owned by Buffalo-based Sorrento Lactalis.  The 
WRB awarded Sorrento the “Grinch of the Year” award for refusing to negotiate with workers.  
The CEJ led the living wage campaign by building broad support for the measure and 
getting help from community organizations and local union activists.  In 1999, the city council 
passed an ordinance mandating that government contractors pay a living wage (now $9.03 an hour 
with health insurance or $10.15 without).  Because of fiscal problems, however, the city never 
enforced the ordinance.  CEJ sued the city and was successful in amending the legislation in 2003 to 
grant enforcement powers to a Living Wage Commission made up of nine community 
representatives, from union, business, religious, community organizations and Cornell ILR.  With 
research assistance from an internship program for law students from the University of Buffalo and 
pro bono attorneys, the Commission has won wage increases for well over 100 workers of 
contractors at city owned parking lots through voluntary compliance agreements with employers.  In 
the process, the Commission is systematically reviewing all city contracts for compliance and 
promoting good government practices by improving contracting procedures within the city 
administration.   
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CEJ is part of a larger movement in Buffalo's labor community to build coalitions around 
broad social goods.  Other labor-led community coalitions have had profound impacts on work and 
economic justice in the region.  An occupational health and safety group dating back to the early 
1970s, WNYCOSH was the product of mass mobilization against workplace hazards.  With broad 
union support, it continues to be a vital force for education, technical assistance and policy 
advocacy.  WNYCOSH works closely with Cornell ILR safety and health programs and with CEJ in 
organizing against sweatshops, for increased minimum wage, and other economic reforms. 
Unlike the other economic development initiatives, which have a strong labor-management 
partnership element, the CEJ confronts low-road employers in a public and visible way.  In the 
minds of union leaders, CEJ fits into the overall scheme of labor’s local development initiatives, 
because strike support, living wage enforcement and mobilizations around plant closures also aim to 
preserve good jobs.  It operates alongside, and in cooperation with, other active coalitions in the 
region, including WNYCOSH, Champions and others.  In addition, it links local activists to national 
campaigns, such as Cintas and Sorrento.  CEJ is an example of social movement unionism, in the 
sense that it mobilizes broad community support for the struggles of workers, through rally turnout, 
policy advocacy and grassroots forms of policy implementation.  Nevertheless, its semi-
independence from traditional union structures has made some more conservative union leaders 
ambivalent about CEJ, as some are skeptical of social movement unionism in general. 
 
 
 
Assessment  
 
Greater Buffalo unionists have set up the EDG and CEJ, engendered the Champions’ Network, 
helped steer the NYPA relicensing project, and promoted early childhood education, as they often 
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put it in interviews, in order “to be part of the solution” to the region’s problems.  These union 
leaders are trying to create a high road economy through job retention, economic development and 
training projects, while blocking the low road by punishing union-busting employers.  Their path is 
marked by modest successes.  They pragmatically mix labor-management partnership, social 
dialogue and social movement unionism, and apply the method that fits the issue at hand.  Their 
main ideology is that unions must develop broader, deeper and more positive relationships with 
their communities; that experimenting with new forms of progressive strategy is currently desirable, 
even necessary; and that dialogue with all the relevant stakeholders can be helpful.  The approach is 
comprehensive in its tactics and expansive in its social goals.   
What can we say about results?  How do unions become recognized as part of the solution 
to a region’s problems?  How do we appraise the value of a “high-road social infrastructure?”  How 
do these initiatives affect labor’s power?  Although the answers will become clearer as the projects 
ramp up, the case of Buffalo shows a clear trajectory of innovation.  
 Traditional union strategies, including aggressive political action, collective bargaining and 
organizing, cannot alone solve the new manifestations of age-old problems related to job loss, 
declining wages and limited economic opportunity, primarily because the workers facing these 
problems are outside the orbit of union influence.  Initiatives like those in Buffalo – including most 
of the innovative work done elsewhere by Central Labor Councils – has had few returns in terms of 
membership and collective bargaining gains.  The underlying values of the labor movement and the 
dedication that drives labor activists, however, remain powerful forces that motivate people to break 
free and innovate, to work on a more economically just society.  Rather than extending collective 
bargaining or legal protections to selected groups of workers, these initiatives have the potential to 
reshape the policy agendas of America’s cities and revive activist energies in unions.    
 The current debates within the national AFL-CIO over organizing versus political action, 
or bureaucracy versus democracy, or mergers versus self-determination, do not address the issue at 
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stake here.  How do innovative union leaders experimenting and searching for alternatives deal with 
uncertainty?  Unionists like those in Buffalo’s development coalition, have decided to experiment 
with new forms, to push until it becomes whatever it is to be.  Uncertainty is built in to innovation.  
The alternative, of capturing and controlling activist energy before it exists, will stifle any revival of 
unions as a movement.  The labor movement needs rational structures, but it should also avoid the 
mistakes of the past, when organizational rigidity made it impossible to respond to the needs of the 
new workforce.  AFL leaders once thought that the CIO was not really trade unionism.  Similarly, 
the paths union activists blaze today for high road economic development set the stage for union 
renewal in cities everywhere.   
 The answer may lie in a new definition of power, in which broad, community-based 
dialog, framed by strong principles, takes center stage.  The message and image problems of the 
Democratic Party, widely analyzed since November 2004, are similar to the message and image 
problems of the labor movement.  “They’re always against something,” is a phrase often applied to 
both.  The labor movement is paying dearly for the public perception that they are against business 
(whether it is the non-union minority contractor or Wal-Mart), against trade, against school choice, 
and, of course, the list could go on.  Granted, social and economic justice requires struggle against 
exploitation, inequality, greed and corruption, here and all around the world.  But the labor 
movement also has to be for something, especially in the neighborhoods where they can exercise the 
most influence.  In Western New York, the value-driven energy of optimistic union officials and 
activists has burst out of the existing structures to create new labor-directed projects, such as EDG, 
CEJ, BNJI, Living Wage and the Champions Network.  Not only have unions devised answers to 
some of Buffalo’s problems, but they have also established projects to implement their vision. 
 The AFL-CIO has traditionally utilized political action as the major means to address 
issues beyond the workplace.  In recent years, however, political action has had only a limited pay-
off for organized labor nationwide.  In cities like Buffalo, combining political action with new 
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community initiatives has drawn public attention to the plight of low-wage workers far beyond the 
reach of normal unionism.  Local coalitions for a living wage, for occupational health and safety 
improvements, and for cheap, clean power have done, through direct intervention, what traditional 
approaches could not have accomplished.  Rather than merely winning political access, these 
initiatives have put unions in a position to participate in governance, including policy formation and 
implementation. 
 Traditionally, the organizational framework of unions was given by the political system and 
the legal framework of organizing and collective bargaining.  Employers and politicians were the 
most important allies or adversaries (depending on the situation).  By constructing a high-road 
infrastructure, unions alter the terrain on which they operate.  Through deep coalition building (in 
Buffalo, around energy, childcare, living wage issues or job creation) they create new alliances with 
community groups that provide a power resource beyond political and bargaining power.  By 
working on new kinds of policies and creating new projects to implement them, they strengthen the 
community’s capacity to deal with problems.  By getting attention for their efforts from the local 
media, they shift the debate over how best to cope with the region’s economic development 
problems.  This new form of power is a power to, rather than a power over. 
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Figure 1: Industry Restructuring in Buffalo 
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Table 1.  Economic change in Buffalo and the surrounding area. 
  
Union Density 
Buffalo-
Niagara Falls 
msa (percent) 
Employment 
Buffalo-
Niagara 
Falls msa 
(thousands) 
Unemployment 
Buffalo-
Niagara Falls 
msa (percent) 
Unemployment, 
Buffalo city 
(percent) 
1986 33.3 481.1    
1987 31.7 482    
1988 33.3 539.2    
1989 28.8 562    
1990 28.3 508 6.6 10.2 
1991 32.1 496.6 7.2 11.5 
1992 28.9 518.4 8.7 13.8 
1993 29.2 538.1 7.6 12.1 
1994 28.7 522.1 7.3 11.5 
1995 26.1 471.8 6.3 10.2 
1996 26.7 461.3 6 9.5 
1997 27.7 518.5 5.9 9.2 
1998 26.5 510.1 6.2 9.7 
1999 27.3 521.2 6.4 10 
2000 31.1 497.8 7 9.5 
2001 32.3 491.2 6.7 8.8 
2002 30.2 494.3 7 11 
2003 25.3 499.6 6.7 10.5 
2004  23.2  505.4 7.8 12.3 
Sources: metropolitan employment levels and union density come from 
Hirsch & McPherson’s website, www.unionstats.com.  Unemployment figures 
for the city and region come from the Department of Labor’s monthly 
estimates for January of each year, downloaded from www.dol.gov.  
 
 
 
 
